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Abstract:	  9	  
What	  is	  meaning?	  While	  traditionally	  the	  domain	  of	  philosophy	  and	  linguistics,	  this	  question,	  and	  10	  
others	   related	   to	   it,	   is	  critical	   for	  cognitive	  and	  comparative	  approaches	   to	  communication.	  This	  11	  
short	  essay	  provides	  a	  concise	  and	  accessible	  description	  of	  how	  the	  term	  meaning	  can	  and	  should	  12	  
be	  used,	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  ‘intentional	  communication’,	  and	  what	  would	  constitute	  good	  evidence	  13	  
of	  meaning	   in	  animal	  communication,	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   is	   relevant	   for	  comparisons	  with	  human	  14	  
language.	  15	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Introduction	  21	  
	   In	  any	  discussion	  of	  communication,	  human,	  animal,	  or	  otherwise,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  avoid	  the	  22	  
term	  meaning.	  An	  intuitive	  use	  of	  the	  term	  is	  to	  describe	  the	  effects	  that	  a	  signal	  tends	  to	  have,	  23	  
and/or	  the	  objects	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  pick	  out	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  is,	  for	  instance,	  a	  natural	  turn	  of	  phrase	  24	  
to	  say	  that	  the	  famous	  vervet	  alarm	  calls	  mean	  ‘snake’,	  ‘eagle’,	  and	  ‘leopard’.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  25	  
is	  also	  natural	   to	  use	  meaning	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  cognitive	  aspects	  of	  human	  communication:	  when	  26	  
we	  talk	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  words,	  what	  we	  mean	  to	  refer	  to	  is	  not	  just	  the	  literal	  translation	  of	  27	  
those	  words,	  but	  also	   the	   intentions	   that	  we	  have	  as	   speakers.	  For	   instance,	  when	  we	  say	  “Can	  28	  
you	  pass	  me	  the	  sugar?”,	  we	  (typically)	  do	  not	  simply	  wish	  to	  enquire	  about	  whether	  the	  audience	  29	  
is	  able	  to	  pass	  the	  sugar;	  we	  instead	  mean	  that	  we	  would	  actually	  like	  them	  to	  pass	  us	  the	  sugar.	  30	  
Meaning,	  then,	  is	  a	  ubiquitous	  term,	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  at	  least	  two	  related	  but	  different	  uses.	  31	  
	   This	  potential	  for	  ambiguity	  around	  meaning	  can	  make	  comparisons	  between	  human	  and	  32	  
animal	   communication	  hazardous.	  Are	   any	   animal	   signals,	   such	   as	   birdsong	  or	   the	   vervet	   alarm	  33	  
calls,	  meaningful	   in	   the	  way	   that	  words	   are?	   If	   so,	   how,	   and	   to	  what	   extent?	   To	   answer	   these	  34	  
questions,	  we	   need	   a	   concise	   account	   of	   how	   the	   term	  meaning	   can	   and/or	   should	   be	   used	   in	  35	  
comparisons	  between	  human	  and	  animal	  communication.	  36	  
	   In	  this	  short	  essay,	  I	  provide	  such	  an	  account.	  In	  the	  following	  sections	  I:	  (i)	  provide	  a	  brief	  37	  
background,	   focusing	   on	   recent	   critiques	   of	   how	   meaning	   and	   associated	   terms	   are	   used;	   (ii)	  38	  
describe	  how	  meaning	  is	  typically	  used	  in	  the	  philosophical	  and	  pragmatics	  literature;	  (iii)	  discuss	  39	  
the	  relationship	  between	  the	  causal	  and	  philosophical	  uses	  of	  meaning;	  (iv)	  explain	  how	  meaning	  40	  
relates	   to	   the	   way	   that	   ‘intentional	   communication’	   has	   been	   operationalised	   in	   the	   animal	  41	  
communication	  literature;	  and	  (v)	  describe	  what	  would	  need	  to	  be	  shown	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  any	  42	  
non-­‐human	   communication	   system	   is	   meaningful	   in	   the	   way	   that	   human	   communication	   is.	   In	  43	  
sum,	   this	   paper	   satisfies	   a	   pressing	   need	   for	   a	   concise	   and	   accessible	   description	   of	   what	  44	  
 page	  3 
constitutes	  meaning	  in	  animal	  communication,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  comparisons	  with	  45	  
human	  language.	  46	  
	  47	  
Meaning	  in	  animal	  communication	  48	  
	   The	  language	  of	  communication	  –	  not	  just	  meaning,	  but	  other	  related	  concepts	  too,	  such	  49	  
as	  information	  and	  reference	  –	  has	  historically	  been	  used	  in	  the	  animal	  communication	  literature	  50	  
often	  in	  a	  loose	  and	  largely	  intuitive	  way.	  Researchers	  often	  write	  that	  a	  particular	  animal	  signals	  51	  
‘means’,	  ‘refers	  to’,	  or	  ‘carries	  information	  about’	  some	  particular	  feature	  of	  the	  world.	  However,	  52	  
the	   degree	   to	   which	   such	   statements	   are	   meant	   to	   encourage	   the	   thought	   that	   the	   signal	   in	  53	  
question	  is	  similar	  to	  or	  possibly	  even	  related	  to	  human	  communication	  varies	  between	  cases.	  In	  54	  
some	  instances,	  such	  comparisons	  are	  very	  much	  the	  point,	  while	  in	  others,	  this	  language	  is	  used	  55	  
only	   as	   shorthand:	   a	   convenient	   way	   to	   describe,	   in	   a	   metaphorical	   way,	   how	   a	   given	   signal	  56	  
appears	  to	  work.	  57	  
	   Some	  researchers	  have	  critiqued	  these	  and	  associated	  practices	  at	  length,	  arguing	  that	  the	  58	  
use	   of	   terms	   that	   have	   been	   co-­‐opted	   from	   linguistics,	   and	   other	   disciplines	   that	   study	   human	  59	  
communication,	  is	  wont	  to	  lead	  animal	  communication	  research	  astray	  (Owings	  &	  Morton,	  1997;	  60	  
Owren	  &	  Rendell,	  2001;	  Owren	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Rendall	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Wheeler	  &	  Fischer,	  2012).	  The	  61	  
nub	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  between-­‐species	  comparisons,	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  pre-­‐62	  
judge	  matters,	  but	  casual	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  meaning	  –	  for	  which	  there	   is	  a	  rich	  philosophical	  63	  
literature	   –	  substantially	   increases	   the	   chances	   that	   we	   will	   inadvertently	   do	   so.	   Such	   critiques	  64	  
have	  had	  significant	  impact	  in	  recent	  years	  (see	  Stegmann,	  2013	  for	  a	  collection	  of	  views).	  This	  has	  65	  
been	   especially	   true	   in	   non-­‐human	   primate	   communication	   research,	   perhaps	   unsurprisingly,	  66	  
given	  that	  comparisons	  with	  human	  communication	  are	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  motivations	  for	  such	  67	  
research.	  This	   increased	  care	  over	   terminology	  has	  encouraged	  researchers	   to	  consider	   in	  detail	  68	  
how	   the	   existence	   of	   human-­‐like	   ‘meaning’	   (not	   to	   mention	   other,	   related	   concepts)	   could	   be	  69	  
 page	  4 
tested	  for	  in	  non-­‐human	  primate	  communication.	  However,	  there	  is	  not	  as	  yet	  any	  consensus	  on	  70	  
this.	  71	  
	   What,	  then,	  would	  constitute	  good	  evidence	  of	  animal	  signals	  having	  human-­‐like	  meaning?	  72	  
One	   recent	   study,	   explicitly	  motivated	  by	   comparisons	  with	  human	   language,	   and	   aware	  of	   the	  73	  
fact	   that	   we	   cannot	   simply	   ascribe	   word-­‐like	   meaning	   to	   signals	   willy-­‐nilly,	   claimed	   to	   have	  74	  
identified	  the	   ‘meaning’	  of	  chimpanzee	  gestures	  based	  on	  documentation	  of	  gestures	   that	  were	  75	  
intentionally	  produced,	  and	  which	  consistently	  led	  to	  apparently	  satisfactory	  outcomes	  (Hobaiter	  76	  
&	  Byrne,	  2014).	  Are	  these	  criteria	  –	  intentional	  production	  and	  persistent,	  satisfactory	  outcomes	  –	  77	  
appropriate?	  If	  not,	  what	  would	  be?	  To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  we	  must	  turn	  to	  philosophy	  and	  78	  
pragmatics,	  and	  discuss	  the	  meaning	  of	  meaning	  itself.	  79	  
	   	  80	  
Meaning	  in	  human	  communication	  81	  
	   In	   a	   famous	   essay,	   entitled	   simply	   ‘Meaning’,	   the	   philosopher	   Paul	   Grice	   distinguished	  82	  
between	   natural	   meaning	   and	   non-­‐natural	   meaning	   (1957).	   Natural	   meaning	   describes	   stable	  83	  
relationships	  between	  two	  things	  in	  the	  world,	  where	  one	  reliably	  predicts	  the	  other.	  Those	  spots	  84	  
‘mean’	  measles;	  that	  noise	  ‘means’	  trouble.	  Non-­‐natural	  meaning,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  the	  meaning	  that	  85	  
a	   speaker	   intends	   to	   communicate	   when	   they	   use	   language	   and	   some	   other	   forms	   of	   human	  86	  
communication.	  	  87	  
	   Grice	  stated	  three	  criteria	  for	  something	  to	  qualify	  as	  having	  non-­‐natural	  meaning.	  The	  first	  88	  
is	   that	   the	   signaller	   must	   intend	   to	   achieve	   in	   the	   audience	   a	   particular	   response.Second,	   the	  89	  
audience	  must	   recognise	   that	   the	  speaker	  has	   this	   intention.	  Suppose	   that	  we	  are	   in	  a	  bar.	   It	   is	  90	  
your	  turn	  to	  buy	  the	  drinks,	  and	  I	  would	  like	  another.	  I	  intend	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  this	  (the	  first	  of	  91	  
Grice’s	  criteria,	  above),	  and	  I	  therefore	  make	  sure	  that	  my	  empty	  glass	  is	  visible	  to	  you.	  However,	  92	  
suppose	  that	  I	  do	  not	  do	  anything	  to	  explicitly	  bring	  attention	  to	  it.	  With	  regards	  such	  cases,	  Grice	  93	  
argued	  that	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  going	  on	  here	  to	  say	  that	  I	  meant	  that	  I	  would	  like	  another	  drink.	  94	  
 page	  5 
All	  I	  have	  done	  is	  provided	  evidence	  that	  might	  or	  might	  not	  indicate	  as	  much.	  Grice	  thus	  added	  95	  
the	   following,	   third	   criterion	   to	   address	   this:	   that	   the	   listener	   should	   recognise	   the	   speaker’s	  96	  
intention,	   and	   the	   listener	   should	   grasp	   the	   intended	   meaning	   at	   least	   in	   part	   because	   he	  97	  
recognises	  the	  speaker’s	  intention.	  This	  criterion	  is	  satisfied	  if,	  rather	  than	  simply	  ensuring	  that	  my	  98	  
empty	  glass	  is	  visible,	  I	  make	  eye	  contact	  with	  my	  friend	  and	  simultaneously	  tilt	  my	  wine	  glass,	  or	  99	  
express	  my	  intentions	  in	  some	  other	  conspicuous	  way.	  Here,	  not	  only	  do	  I	   intend	  that	  my	  friend	  100	  
believes	  that	  I	  would	  like	  another	  drink,	  but	  my	  friend	  believes	  this	  in	  part	  because	  she	  recognises	  101	  
that	   this	   is	  my	  very	   intention.	  Now	  we	  can	  say	   that	   I	  mean	   that	   I	  would	   like	  another	  drink.	  The	  102	  
Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  summarises	  these	  three	  criteria	  using	  an	  example	  of	  a	  driver	  103	  
who	   flashes	  her	   car	   lights	  at	  another	  driver,	  with	   the	   intention	   that	   the	  other	  driver	  will	   realise	  104	  
that	  he	  does	  not	  have	  his	  own	  lights	  on.	  Here,	  the	  driver	  who	  flashes	  her	  lights	  intends	  that:	  (i)	  the	  105	  
other	  driver	  should	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  his	  lights	  are	  not	  on;	  (ii)	  the	  other	  driver	  recognises	  that	  106	  
this	  change	  in	  belief	  is	  the	  first	  driver’s	  intention;	  and	  (iii)	  this	  recognition	  is	  part	  of	  his	  reason	  for	  107	  
believing	  that	  his	  lights	  are	  not	  on.	  108	  
	   This	  Gricean	  analysis	  dominates	  contemporary	  discussion	  of	  meaning.	  Many	  modifications	  109	  
and	  reformulations	  have	  been	  proposed	  (e.g.	  Strawson,	  1964;	  Schiffer,	  1972;	  Neale,	  1992;	  Sperber	  110	  
&	  Wilson,	  1995;	  Recanati,	  2004).	  Animal	  communication	   researchers	  should	  not	  expect	   that	   the	  111	  
philosophy	  of	   language	  will	   speak	  with	  a	   single	   voice	  on	   the	  matter	  of	  meaning	  any	   time	   soon.	  112	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  Grice’s	  key	  insight	  remains	  central	  to	  most	  discussion.	  That	  key	  113	  
insight	   is	   that	  meaning	   is	   auto-­‐deictic:	   stimuli	   that	   have	   non-­‐natural	  meaning	   point	   to	   the	   very	  114	  
intentions	  that	  triggered	  their	  production	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  115	  
	   Another	   way	   to	   make	   this	   point	   is	   to	   say	   that	   meaningful	   communication	   is	   not	   only	  116	  
intentional,	   it	   is	   also	   overtly	   intentional	   –	  it	   brings	   attention	   to	   the	   intentions	   that	   are	   being	  117	  
expressed.	  When,	  for	  instance,	  I	  tilt	  my	  coffee	  cup	  to	  request	  a	  refill,	  I	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  brings	  118	  
attention	   not	   only	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   my	   cup	   is	   empty,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   tilt	   is	  119	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communicative	   i.e.	   to	   the	  very	   fact	   that	   I	  am	  trying	   to	  communicate	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  Similarly,	  120	  
when	  I	  speak,	   I	  provide	  evidence	  not	  only	  for	  what	  I	  wish	  to	  communicate,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  very	  121	  
fact	  that	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  communicate	  something.	  My	  behaviour	  is	  overtly	  intentional.	  122	  
	  123	  
Meaning	  and	  levels	  of	  analysis	  124	  
	   Clearly,	   not	   all	   animal	   signals	   are	   meaningful	   in	   this	   way.	   Many	   animal	   communication	  125	  
researchers,	  when	  they	  say	  that	  a	  particular	  signal	  ‘means’	  something,	  do	  not	  actually	  wish	  to	  say	  126	  
that	   something	   as	   cognitively	   rich	   as	   the	   notion	   described	   above	   is	   being	   used.	   For	   instance,	  127	  
birdsong	  can	  be	  said	  to	  ‘mean’	  something	  like	  ‘come	  mate	  with	  me’,	  but	  I	  doubt	  that	  researchers	  128	  
that	   use	   such	   language	   wish	   to	   commit	   themselves	   to	   the	   view	   that	   birdsong	   involves	   the	  129	  
expression	   and	   recognition	   of	   intentions,	   in	   the	   way	   described	   above.	   In	   general,	   the	   term	  130	  
meaning	  tends	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  animal	  literature	  more	  simply,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  effect	  that	  131	  
a	  signal	  has,	  and/or	  the	  object	  that	  it	  picks	  out	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  132	  
Gricean	  notion	  of	  meaning,	  described	  above,	  relates	  to	  the	  more	  intuitive	  use	  that	  is	  common	  in	  133	  
the	  animal	  communication	  literature.	  134	  
	   The	   key	   difference	   between	   Gricean	   (non-­‐natural)	   meaning	   and	   meaning	   in	   this	   more	  135	  
intuitive	   sense	   is	   that	   they	   describe	   different	   levels	   of	   analysis.	   Specifically,	   whereas	   the	  136	  
philosophical	  notion	  of	  meaning	  describes	  how	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  proximate	  mechanisms	  (namely	  137	  
intentions)	   can	  work	   to	  make	   communication	  possible,	   the	  more	   colloquial	   usage	  describes	   the	  138	  
ultimate	  level	  function(s)	  that	  a	  signal	  has,	  and/or	  the	  effects	  it	  reliably	  has	  on	  receivers	  (Krebs	  &	  139	  
Dawkins,	   1984).	   (This	   ultimate/proximate	   distinction	   is	   central	   to	   evolutionary	   approaches	   to	  140	  
behaviour.	   Put	   briefly,	   ultimate	   level	   explanations	   are	   concerned	  with	  why	   a	   trait	   exists,	   while	  141	  
proximate	   level	   explanations	   are	   concerned	   with	   how	   it	   works	   (see	   Davies	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Scott-­‐142	  
Phillips	  et	  al.,	  2011).)	  For	  example,	  the	  function	  of	  mating	  calls	  is	  to	  cause	  in	  others	  a	  willingness	  to	  143	  
mate,	  and	  the	  function	  of	  alarm	  calls	   is	  to	  alert	  other	  animals	  to	  potential	  predators.	  Under	  this	  144	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usage,	   the	   word	   ‘meaning’	   describes	   what	   would	   trigger	   these	   effects,	   as	   if	   a	   signal	   were	   an	  145	  
instance	  of	  Gricean	  communication.	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  ultimate	  function	  of	  a	  call	  can	  be	  then	  used	  146	  
to	  guide	  research	  into	  the	  specific	  proximate	  mechanisms	  involved.	  Indeed,	  given	  that	  proximate	  147	  
mechanisms	  are	  often	  the	  main	  focus	  for	  many	  comparative	  psychologists,	  this	   is	  often	  the	  very	  148	  
point	  of	   identifying	  the	   ‘meaning’	  of	  the	  signal	   in	  the	  first	  place.	  After	  all,	  comparisons	  between	  149	  
different	   proximate	   mechanisms	   are	   relevant	   for	   many	   questions	   in	   animal	   cognition,	   not	   just	  150	  
those	  associated	  with	  communication.	  151	  
	   Another	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  intuitive	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘meaning’	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  describes	  a	  152	  
type	  of	  natural	  meaning.	  In	  other	  words,	  birdsong	  ‘means’	  ‘come	  mate	  with	  me’	  in	  the	  same	  way	  153	  
that	  clouds	  ‘mean’	  rain:	  there	  is	  a	  reliable	  association	  between	  one	  thing	  in	  the	  world	  and	  another	  154	  
(clouds	  and	  rain	  in	  one	  case,	  song	  and	  sexual	  receptivity	  in	  the	  other).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  155	  
clouds	  are	  signals.	  Rather,	  I	  am	  pointing	  out	  that	  animal	  signals,	  like	  clouds,	  have	  natural	  meaning.	  156	  
A	  useful	  term	  is	  to	  describe	  such	  signals	  is	  natural	  codes:	  sets	  of	  reliable	  associations	  that	  makes	  157	  
communication	   possible	   (Wharton,	   2003;	   2009;	   Scott-­‐Phillips,	   2014;	   2015).	   Natural	   codes	   have	  158	  
natural	  meaning.	  159	  
	   Human	   languages	   are	   not	   natural	   codes.	   They	   do	   not	   make	   communication	   possible	  160	  
(Sperber,	  1995).	  Instead,	  languages	  are	  sets	  of	  conventional	  codes.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  whereas	  161	  
natural	   codes	   make	   communication	   possible,	   what	   languages	   do	   is	   make	   an	   existing	  162	  
communication	   system	   –	  one	   based	   on	   Gricean,	   non-­‐natural	   meaning	   –	  expressively	   powerful	  163	  
(Wharton,	   2009;	   Scott-­‐Phillips,	   2014).	   Framed	   this	   way,	   the	   key	   question	   for	   comparisons	   with	  164	  
human	  language	  is	  whether	  the	  meaning	  observed	  in	  any	  given	  case	  is	  natural	  meaning	  (which	  is	  a	  165	  
product	  of	  communication	  that	  is	  made	  possible	  by	  reliable	  associations	  between	  phenomena	  in	  166	  
the	  world)	  or	  non-­‐natural	  meaning	  (which	  is	  a	  product	  of	  communication	  that	  is	  made	  possible	  by	  167	  
the	  expression	  and	  recognition	  of	  intentions).	  168	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   This	   difference	   between	   these	   two	   approaches	   to	   meaning	   has	   obvious	   potential	   for	  169	  
confusion	  and	  misunderstanding.	  This	   is	  not	   simply	  because	   the	   two	  accounts	  are	  different,	  but	  170	  
also	  because	  cross-­‐species	  comparison	  of	  communication,	  especially	  when	  one	  of	  those	  species	  is	  171	  
humans,	   is	   a	   topic	   of	   inter-­‐	   and	   multidisciplinary	   interest,	   where	   audiences	   with	   different	  172	  
backgrounds	  may	   come	   with	   quite	   different	   sets	   of	   assumptions	   and	   knowledge.	   In	   particular,	  173	  
philosophers	  and	  others	   familiar	  with	   the	  Gricean	  account	  of	  meaning	  may	  not	  be	   familiar	  with	  174	  
the	   ultimate/proximate	   distinction.	   Similarly,	   students	   of	   animal	   communication	   may	   not	   be	  175	  
wholly	  familiar	  with	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Gricean	  approach.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  often	  not	  clear	  exactly	  176	  
what	  a	  researcher	  who	  claims	  that,	  say,	  a	  monkey	  call	  ‘means’	  ‘eagle!’,	  actually	  has	  in	  mind:	  they	  177	  
could,	   quite	  plausibly,	   be	   referring	   either	   to	  proximate	   intentions,	   or	   to	   the	   signal’s	   effects	   and	  178	  
ultimate	  functionality.	  Greater	  clarity	  about	  the	  intended	  meaning	  of	  such	  claims	  is	  desirable.	  179	  
	   These	   two	  different	   approaches	   to	  meaning	  do	  however	   share	  one	   important	   feature	   in	  180	  
common:	  they	  are	  both	  about	  how	  signals	  do	  things	  to	  others	  (Scott-­‐Phillips,	  2010).	   In	  one	  case,	  181	  
what	  signals	  do	   is	  change	  behaviour,	  and	  the	  design	  comes	  by	  virtue	  of	  natural	  selection,	  which	  182	  
produces	  organisms	   that	  behave	   in	  goal-­‐directed	  ways	   (Gardner,	  2009).	   In	   the	  other	   case,	  what	  183	  
signals	   do	   is	   change	   mental	   states,	   and	   the	   design	   comes	   by	   virtue	   of	   human	   intentions	  184	  
(notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   capacity	   for	   this	   is	   of	   course	   itself	   a	   product	   of	   natural	  185	  
selection).	  This	  quality	  –	  that	   signals	  do	   things	  –	  is	  what	  unites	  different	  ways	  of	  using	   the	   term	  186	  
meaning.	  187	  
	   Clearly	  many	  animal	  communication	  systems	  only	  have	  meaning	  in	  the	  intuitive,	  ultimate	  188	  
level	   sense.	   It	   is	   equally	   clear	   that	   human	   communication	   has	   meaning	   in	   the	   Gricean	   sense	  189	  
described	   in	   the	   previous	   section.	   Consequently,	   a	   key	   question	   in	   comparative	   cognition	   is	  190	  
whether	  any	  other	  species	  do	  too.	  191	  
	  192	  
Meaning	  and	  intentionality	  193	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   One	   prominent	   concept	   in	   the	   study	   of	   animal	   communication	   is	   that	   of	   'intentional	  194	  
communication'	   (see	   Liebal	   et	   al.,	   2014	   for	   a	   review).	   In	   part	   motivated	   by	   comparisons	   with	  195	  
language	   and	   some	   other	   forms	   of	   human	   communication,	   many	   studies	   investigate	   whether	  196	  
animal	   signals	   are	   used	   intentionally,	   or	   not.	  The	   criteria	   used	   to	   identify	   intentional	  197	  
communication	   vary	   somewhat	   across	   studies	   (in	   part	   due	   to	   methodological	   limitations),	   but	  198	  
some	   general	   practices	   have	   been	   established,	   including	   in	   particular	   the	   appropriate	   use	   of	  199	  
persistence	  and	  elaboration	  (i.e.	  continued	  use	  of	  a	  behaviour	  until	  its	  objectives	  have	  been	  met,	  200	  
and	  the	  use	  of	  alternative	  or	  modified	  signals	   in	  case	  of	   failure).	  Several	  natural	  communication	  201	  
systems	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  satisfy	  these	  criteria.	  The	  most	  widely	  attested	  case	  is	  that	  of	  great	  202	  
ape	   gestural	   communication	   (Tomasello,	   2008),	   but	   there	   are	   others,	   including	   some	   in	   non-­‐203	  
mammalian	  species,	  such	  as	  the	  head	  shakes	  of	  grouper	  fish	  (Vail	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  204	  
	   Intentional	  communication	   is	  not	   the	  same	  thing	  as	  communication	  that	   is	  meaningful	   in	  205	  
the	   Gricean	   sense.	   As	   mentioned,	   Gricean	   communication	   is	   not	   only	   intentional,	   it	   is	   overtly	  206	  
intentional.	  In	  other	  words,	  not	  only	  are	  signals	  used	  in	  a	  voluntary	  (i.e.	  intentional)	  way,	  but	  this	  207	  
fact	   is	   made	   explicit	   (overt)	   to	   the	   audience,	   and	   this	   explicitness	   contributes	   to	   successful	  208	  
comprehension.	   Consequently,	   demonstration	   of	   intentionality	   in	   animal	   communication	   is	   not	  209	  
sufficient	   to	   demonstrate	   meaning	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   is	   relevant	   to	   comparisons	   with	   human	  210	  
communication.	  What	  must	   also	  be	   shown	   is	   that	   the	   signaller	   intended	   to	  make	   this	   intention	  211	  
explicit,	  and	  that	  this	  overtness	  contributes	  to	  comprehension.	  212	  
	   How	  can	  these	  criteria	  be	  operationalised	  for	  empirical	  research?	  One	  way	  might	  be	  via	  a	  213	  
distinction	   between	   behaviours	   where	   the	   intentionality	   is	   overt,	   and	   those	   where	   the	  214	  
intentionality	   is	   partially	   covert.	   Here	   is	   a	   human	   example	   (adapted	   from	   Grice,	   1989;	   and	  215	  
Wharton,	  2003):	  216	  
(a) Mary	   intends	   that	   her	  mother	   sees	   that	   she	   is	   unwell.	  Mary	   thus	   greets	   her	  mother	  217	  
with	  an	  exaggeratedly	  sad	  face,	  and	  overtly	  points	  to	  her	  forehead,	  which	  is	  pale.	  218	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(b) Mary	  intends	  that	  her	  mother	  sees	  that	  she	  is	  unwell.	  However,	  she	  doesn’t	  want	  this	  219	  
intention	  to	  be	  noticed	  (it	  might	  decrease	  her	  chances	  of	  getting	  a	  day	  off	  school).	  So	  220	  
Mary	  pretends	  to	  be	  asleep,	  but	  ensures	  that	  her	  pale	  forehead	  is	  fully	  visible.	  221	  
In	  (a),	  Mary	  has	  an	  overtly	  expressed	  intention	  that	  her	  mother	  believes	  she	  is	  unwell,	  whereas	  in	  222	  
(b),	  the	  same	  intention	   is	  expressed	  only	  covertly.	  By	  the	  appropriate	  use	  of	  these	  two	  different	  223	  
behaviours,	   Mary	   shows	   us	   that	   she	   has	   command	   over	   the	   difference	   between	   overtly	   and	  224	  
covertly	  expressed	  intentions,	  and	  hence	  of	  (Gricean,	  non-­‐natural)	  meaning.	  225	  
	   We	  presently	  have	  no	  evidence	  that	  any	  non-­‐human	  species	  (primate	  or	  otherwise)	  is	  able	  226	  
to	  make	   the	   same	  distinction.	   Thus,	  we	  have	  no	  good	  evidence	   that	   the	   communication	  of	   any	  227	  
non-­‐human	   species	   is	   meaningful	   in	   the	   way	   that	   words	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   human	  228	  
communication	   are.	   For	   a	   signal	   to	   be	   meaningful	   in	   the	   Gricean	   sense,	   it	   must	   be	   overtly	  229	  
intentional,	  and	  we	  do	  not	  have	  good	  evidence	  of	  overt	  intentionality	  in	  any	  non-­‐human	  species.	  I	  230	  
mentioned	   earlier	   one	   recent	   analysis,	   which	   claims	   to	   report	   the	   ‘meanings’	   of	   chimpanzee	  231	  
gestures	   based	   on	   documentation	   of	   intentionally	   produced	   gestures	   that	   consistently	   led	   to	  232	  
apparently	   satisfactory	   outcomes	   (Hobaiter	  &	   Byrne,	   2014).	   This	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   demonstrate	  233	  
meaning	  in	  the	  sense	  relevant	  for	  comparisons	  with	  human	  language.	  Overt	  intentionality	  has	  not	  234	  
been	   shown,	   and	   without	   this,	   we	   do	   not	   have	   grounds	   to	   claim	   that	   these	   behaviours	   have	  235	  
meaning	  in	  the	  way	  that	  human	  words	  do.	  236	  
	   	  237	  
Summary	  and	  conclusion	  238	  
	   How	  should	  the	  term	  meaning	  be	  used?	  Above	  I	  described	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  has	  been	  239	  
used	   –	  one	   casual	   and	   intuitive,	   and	  widely	   used	   in	   animal	   communication	   research;	   the	   other	  240	  
philosophical	  and	  more	  precise	  –	  and	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  term	  be	  used	  in	  the	  latter	  241	  
sense	  alone.	  This	  approach	  is	  contrary	  to	  other	  critiques,	  which	  recommend	  avoidance	  of	  the	  term	  242	  
meaning	  altogether	  (unless	  researchers	  really	  do	  mean	  to	  refer	  to	  Gricean,	  non-­‐natural	  meaning).	  243	  
 page	  11 
Instead,	  these	  critiques	  suggest	  alternative	  terminology,	  based	  on	  the	   language	  of	   influence	  and	  244	  
effects,	  rather	  than	  of	  information,	  meaning,	  and	  associated	  concepts	  (Rendall	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Owren	  245	  
et	  al.,	  2010).	  While	  I	  certainly	  agree	  that	  meaning	  is	  too	  often	  used	  too	  casually,	  there	  are	  benefits	  246	  
to	  the	  use	  of	  intuitive	  language,	  in	  particular	  plain	  convenience.	  Behavioural	  ecology	  has	  long	  used	  247	  
the	   language	   of	   intentions	   and	   other	  mental	   states	   as	   shorthand	   to	   describe	   behaviour	   at	   the	  248	  
ultimate	   level.	  An	  expression	   like	  “offspring	  are	   selected	   to	  demand	  more	   food	   than	   the	  parent	  249	  
wants	  to	  give”	  is	  far	  more	  easy	  to	  use	  than	  alternatives	  that	  do	  not	  use	  the	  language	  of	  intentions:	  250	  
“During	  the	  course	  of	  evolution	  selection	  acting	  on	  genetic	  differences	  in	  the	  begging	  behaviour	  of	  251	  
offspring	   will	   have	   favoured	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   intensity	   of	   begging,	   and	   this	   will	   have	   been	  252	  
favoured	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  level	  of	  begging	  by	  any	  individual	  offspring	  exceeds	  the	  optimum	  253	  
level	  for	  the	  parent”	  (example	  from	  Krebs	  &	  Davies,	  1993,	  p.3).	  Such	  practice	  is	  not	  problematic	  so	  254	  
long	   as	   researchers	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   these	   are	   ultimate	   level	   descriptions,	   and	   use	   them	  255	  
accordingly.	  256	  
	   It	   is	  at	  the	  proximate	   level	  that	  more	  explicitness	   is	  needed.	  Researchers	  that	  do	  wish	  to	  257	  
discuss	  whether	  any	  particular	  instance	  of	  animal	  communication	  is	  meaningful	   in	  the	  same	  way	  258	  
that	   human	   words	   are	   should	   make	   explicit	   reference	   to	   Gricean,	   non-­‐natural	   meaning.	   I	   am	  259	  
personally	  skeptical	   that	  any	  non-­‐human	  species	  uses	  non-­‐natural	  meaning	   (Scott-­‐Phillips,	  2014;	  260	  
2015).	  However,	  this	  is	  ultimately	  an	  empirical	  issue,	  and	  the	  key	  criterion	  is	  that	  signals	  should	  be	  261	  
overtly	  intentional.	  This	  has	  to	  date	  not	  been	  shown	  in	  any	  non-­‐human	  species.	  262	  
	  263	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